Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1981

The Effect of Depressive Affect on Judgments of Frequency of
Occurrence
Carol L. Curt
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Curt, Carol L., "The Effect of Depressive Affect on Judgments of Frequency of Occurrence" (1981).
Master's Theses. 3230.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/3230

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1981 Carol L. Curt

/

THE EFFECT OF DEPRESSIVE AFFECT ON JUDGMENTS
OF FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE

by

Carol L. Curt

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

September
1981

''-

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and
encouragement provided by the director of her thesis committee,
Dr. Eugene B. Zechmeister. She would also like to thank the
members of her conunittee, Dr. Thomas P. Petzel and Dr. Frank L.
Slaymaker. In addition, great appreciation is extended to
Dr. James E. Johnson.

ii.

VITA
Carol

~YnA

the daugnter of

Curt was born in Cnicago, Illinois on 31 January 1956,

Ch~rles

and Edith

{~llingl

Curt. She received her

elementary and sacondary education i.n the public schools of Chicago,
and, in 1973, qraduated from Roald Amundsen high school.
In September of .l973, Carol. ente;t'ed Loyola University of Chicago,
and, iP-. May of
laude[ with a

~9.77 1

~jar

received the deg:t'ae of aachelor of Science (cum
in psychology.

Carol entered the graduate program in Experimental Psychology
at Loyola i·n September of .:1978. Sne was granted research assistantships
each of her fi·rst three years at Loyola,

s~rving

her first two years

under Or. Frank L. Slaymaker and her third year under both Dr. Slaymaker
and Dr. Eugene B. Zechme:i:ster. She has been a part-time faculty member
at Loyola s:i:nce July .l980, teaching courses in introductory psychology,
research methodology, and statistics. Sne also became a part-time
faculty member at Barat College in Lake Forest, Illinois in the fall of
.l98.l, teaching the

course in human learning.

underg~aduate

Carol has co-authored {Wi;tn Dr. Zechmeister and J .A •. Sebastian)
the article.

"Erro~:s

in a recognition ·memory task are a U-shaped func-

tion of word fre.q'lency" wh..ic;:h was published in the Bulletin of the
Psychonomic Society· ±n June.

~978.

She and Dr. Zechmeister have also

collaborated on tWQ pape;rs; "I:ncidental learning of associations during
semantic and nanse.u)anttc p;rocessing: I:s contiguity a sufficient factor?"
iii'

which wa,s presented

~t

the meetin9 of The Psychonomi:c Society in

November .1976; and "Primacy, recency, and the availability heuristic"
which was presente_d at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological
Association in May

~9.8J..

iv

TAB~E

OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGlEm'S

ii

VI:rA •
LIST OP

iii
T~ES-

LIST OF FIGURES
CON'l'ENTS OF

vi

Al?l?ENP~ES

INTR,ODUC~ION'

REVI'EW OF THE

vii

'
•

'

"

• viii

'

1

~EVAN'l' ~:tTER.A.TUR,E

Frequency Enco~~ng as- an A~tomat~c ProcessFrequency- JUdgments, Depression, and Availability
of Infomat.ton •
Automaticity and Depression: Methodological Differences •
Automaticity and Availability: A Reexamination of Theory.
The Present Experiment •
METHOD

2
2
6
~

Dr

18

22

Subjects
Lists
Procedure

22
22
26

RESULTS •

28

~

Mood State •
Item Judgments
Category Judgments
Recall

31
34
38

DI'SCUSSION •

43

REFERENCES •

51

APPENDIX A ,

55

APPEND IX B •

57

APPEND IX C •

60

'

v

LIST OF TABLES
Ta,ble

Page
Met~odological

l.

Major

2.

Number of Unique Statements from Each Category

24

3.

Construction of the Lists: Number of Different
Statementa from Each Category by their Frequency
of Occurrence in the List

25

4.

Mean Depresston Scores-

29

5.

Analysi'S of Variance of Item Frequency Judgmenbs
Q\11 SUbjectsL

32

Analysis of Variance of Zero-Frequency Ibems
~ll SubjectsL

35

Analysis of Variance of Category Frequency Judgments
(All Subj ectsl

37

Analysis of Variance of Recall Data (All Subjects)

39

6.

7.

8.

Differences

vi

13

~IS'!

OF FIGURES
l?a.ge

Figure
~:

2.

3.

It~ F:r:eqQ•ncy ~st~tes fo:r: Depressed and
Nond,ep:r:es.sed, SUbjects

33

Frequency- Est:bnates for Zero-Frequency :ttems
frolll Ea.ch Category

36

Mean N'Ultlber of Statements Reca.l.led in Each
Category for Depressed and Nondepressed Subjects

40

vii

CONTENTS OF APPENDICES

Page
APPENDIX A

StjJIJul~

55

Positi:ve, Negati-ve, and Neutral Self-1\eference
Statements
APPENDIX B

56

57

Respons:e. Forxgs ..

Response Parma- for Judgments- of l:tem Frequency
Response Farms- for Judgments of Category Frequency

,

58
59

60

APPENDIX C
Cell Means- for Item Freqaency Esttmates ..

viii

61

INTRODUCTION
Tne frequency of occurrence of events, specifically the frequency
of reinforcment, has been theorized to play a major role in the maintenance of depression. Behavioral theorists (e.g., Ferster, 1974;
Lewinsohn, 1974a, 1974bl have argued that depression may result from a
lack or loss of ratnforcement

~astman,

1976}. Cognitive theorists, on

the other hand, have stressed the importance of the depressive's interpretation and distortion of nis reinforcement experiences (Beck, 1974).
In

tnis

vie~,

the depressive's sensitivity to the frequency of rein-

forcement, i.e., the perceived frequency, is considered to be more
important than the actual frequency of reinforcement.
That distortions of frequency information can and do occur is an
idea that is central to cognitive theories of depression. However,
Hasher and Zacks (1979} propose that acquisition

o~J

frequency informa-

tion is an qautomatic" process and is not affected by states that alter
attentional capacity, such as depression. This theory is interesting
as there is substantial evidence that shows that judgments of frequency
are different for depressed and nondepressed subjects (e.g., Buchwald,
1977; Nelson & Craighead, 1977; Wener & Rehm, 1975). However, there is
also evidence to support the notion tnat frequency encoding is an
nautomatic" process (and, therefore, cannot be affected by mood state)
(c.f., Hasher & Zacks, 1979, Exp. 3}. The present research is intended
to investigate tnis apparent discrepancy and clarify the relationship
between depression and the processing of frequency information.
1

REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Frequency Encoding as an Automatic Process
It is well established that human beings have an extraordinary
sensitivity to differences in the relative frequency of events, even
for events that seem to have no adaptive value. College students can
accurately estimate the relative background frequencies of words
(Shapiro,

~9691,

single letters (Attneave, 1953), and even pairs of

letters Ctlnderwood,

~97~al

.. They can accurately judge the situational

frequency with which. words occur in a list (Hintzman, l969), and make
separate judgments of the frequency of occurrence for words that occur
at varying frequencies in two different lists CHintzman & Block, 1971;
Reichardt, Shaughnessy, & Zimmerman, l973l .. Subjects can also give
accurate frequency judgments for verbatim repetition of sentences and
can keep this information separate from frequency information about
the repetition of sentences containing the same underlying meaning
(Gude

&

Zechlneister,

~9751 ..

In addition to this amazing sensitivity to frequency information,
the ability to process frequency information is not affected by many
manipulations that usually cause differences in the recall of information .. Sensitivity to frequency of occurrence shows no improvement with
practice (Hasher & Chromiak, l977); instructions and instructional set
have no effect on frequency sensitivity (Flexser & Bower, 1975; Howell,
~973;

Rose & Rowe,

~976);

and frequency sensitivity appears to be

fully developed at an early age (as early as second grade, i.e.,
2

3

approximately eight years oldl, and shows no developmental trend
thereafter (Hasher & Chromiak, 1977).
Hasher and Zacks ll979} suggest that the encoding of frequency
information is an "automatic" process. They describe automatic processes as those that
operate continually to encode certain attributes of whatever
information is the focus of attention. Once a process is
automatized, it can no longer be improved upon either by
additional practice or by feedback about earlier performance.
Automatic processes do not require either awareness or intention,
and their operation cannot be willfully inhibited. They drain
minimal amounts of energy from attentional capacity, allowing
the organism to continue to operate even when extraordinarily
high

d~nds

are made upon that capacity, as in moments of

high stress or injury. The knowledge gained by automatic
processes is accessible to conciousness and can then be used
in a number of ways ••• (p. 359}
Automatic
which

"re~uire

process~s

are contrasted to ''effortful" processes

effort and so limit one's ability to engage simul-

taneously in other effortful processes. The efficiency of effortful
memory operations increases with practice, and their use is voluntary,
often occurring only with specific instructions. We are almost always
aware of the effortful processing mechanisms we are using." (p. 362).
For exampler Hasher and Zacks postulate imagery, mnemonic or elaborative devices, organization and clustering, and rehearsal to be effort-
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ful processes.
Underlying Hasher and Zacks' theory is the concept of attentional
capacity. Viewed as a nonspecific limited resource for cognitive processing, attentional capacity is needed in varying amounts for carrying
out mental operations. Variations in attentional capacity should (by
definitionl have major effects on the efficiency of effortful processes,
but CPy definitionl have no effect on automatic processes. Automatic
processes require minimal drain on capacity and so should not be affected by altered cognitive capacity. One state that is assumed to
alter attentional capacity is depression. Therefore, if the processing
of frequency information is an automatic process, judgments of frequency
should be as accurate for depressives as they are for nondepressives.
Hasher and Zacks (Experiment 3) investigated differences in
frequency judgments in depressed and nondepressed adults. Susceptibility to confusion from subjective sources was also examined. Subjects
were classified as depressed or nondepressed on the basis of their
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). (The median BDI score
of 8.5 was used as the criterion to divide the subjects. The mean
BDI scores were lS.O for the depressed group and 4.9 for the nondepressed group.l The subjects were shown 36 pictures representing
common objects. There were three presentation frequencies of the
pictures; a picture could be shown one, two, or three times. Subjects
were given eight study trials, each of which consisted of the presentation of nine different pictures; these were alternated with eight
imagination trials. The imagination trials were used in order to

5

study confusion from subjective sources. On each imagination trial,
the experimenter named six of the pictures and the subject was required to imagine each of them for 5 sec. There were three imagination
frequencies of the pictures: over the eight imagination trials, a
picture could be named zero, one, or two times. A frequency test was
given immediately after presentation of the last imagination trial.
Subjects were again shown each picture and were asked to tell the
number of times they had se.en it. !t was emphasized that they were to
report how many times they had seen the picture, not how many times
they had imagined it.
Results showed that the mean estimates of the frequency of
occurrence increased with the actual frequency of occurrence, and
these judgments of frequency were identical for depressed and nondepressed subjects. Imagined frequency significantly affected judgments
of actual frequency: increases in imagined frequency caused increases
in judgments of presentation frequency. However, these increases were
the same far depressed and nondepressed subjects. Again, the groups
did not differ in their estimates.
Hasher and Zacks concluded that depressed and nondepressed subjects can equally estimate the frequency of occurrence of events; both
depressed and nandepressed subjects shaw a tendency to confuse internally generated information with externally experienced events; and
depressed subjects are no mare likely than nondepressed subjects to
confuse actual with imagined events. The results support Hasher and
Zacks contention that frequency encoding is an automatic process.

6

Frequency Judgments, Depression, and Availability of Information
Although Hasher and Zacks cite only their single study in support of their proposal that sensitivity to frequency information is not
affected by depression, a relevant body of research already exists in
this area.
In the search for the cause(sl of depression, behavioral theor-

ists have focused on reinforcement contingencies and have suggested
that depression is a function of the rate of reinforcement. Lewinsohn
(l974al has stated that a low rate of positive reinforcement acts as
an eliciting stimulus for some depressive behaviors, such as feelings
of dysphoria, fatigue, and a low rate of activity and verbal behavior.
Lewinsohn's behavioral theory emphasizes the total or absolute amounts
of positive reinforcment. For example, one of the theory's assumptions
is that the total amount of positive reinforcement received by depressed
persons is less than that received by nondepressed persons. In contrast
to this, other theories have emphasized the cognitive aspects of depression. Beck (1974}, for example, postulates that depressives construe
the self, the world, and the future in a negative way, and that this
negative view is maintained by cognitively distorting events that would
be inconsistent with this view (minimizing achievements, maximizing

problems, and ignoring contrary evidence, for example). In the cognitive theories, it is not the total or absolute amount of positive
reinforcement that is important, but the depressive's perception and
distortion of the amount of reinforcement.
Investigations of the relationship between amount of reinforce-
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ment and depression have supported the hypothesis that depressive's
judgments of the frequency of reinforcement may be inaccurate. In a
study by Wener and Rehm (1975}, depressed and nondepressed subjects
80~

were given either

or 20' positive reinforcement on a pseudosocial

intelligence task .. When

a~d

to judge the frequency of positive

reinforcement, the depressed sUbjects• estimates were significantly
lower than the nondepressed subjectsR estimates under both rates of
reinforcement .. Buch.wald (19771 gave "right/wrong" correctness of
response feedback on every trial of a Thorndikian (multiple-choice}
learning task

tsa'

h.igh.er depression

right; SO' wrong}, and found that subjects with

~ores

Unore depressed} tended to underestimate the

number of correct responses more, while subjects with lower depression
scores {less depressed or nondepressedl tended to underestimate less
or to overestimate .. Nelson and Craighead (1977}, using a multiple
choice perception task, gave depressed and nondepressed subjects high
(70%} or low (30%} rates of either reinforcement or punishment. At a

high rate of reinforcement, the depressed subjects significantly
underestimated the frequency of reinforcement. At a low rate of punishment, the depressed subjects• estimates of the frequency of punishment
were greater than the nondepressed subjects• estimates. but this did
not reflect a tendency for the depressed subjects to overestimate the
amount of punishment they had received. Rather, the depressed subjects
were accurate in their estimations of frequency of punishment, while
the nondepressed subjects significantly underestimated the actual
frequency of punishment.
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Apparently in contradiction to the Hasher and Zacks' theory, the
results of these studies indicate that the judgments of frequency of
occurrence tin tnis case, occurrence of reinforcement or punishment)
are affected by a depressed mood. Although not consistent with Hasher
and Zacks' theory, these results may be consistent with an availability
heuristic for judging frequency. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) propose
that frequency judgments are made on the basis of availability, i.e.,
the ease with which relevant instances come to mind. For example, in
one study (l973, Exp. 8}, Tversky and Kahneman presented their subjects
with one of two types of lists: either a list consisting of the names
of l9 famous women and 20 less famous men, or a list consisting of the
names of 19 famous men and 20 less famous women. The subjects were
asked either to recall the names or to judge whether more male or more
female names had been presented. More famous names were recalled than
less famous names (mean recall: 12.3 and 8.4, respectively), and of
those subjects recalling the names, 66% recalled more famous than
nonfamous names while only 15% recalled more nonfamous than famous
names. Of those subjects who judged the frequency of occurrence of
male and female names, 81% erroneously judged the class consisting of
the more famous names to be more frequent. Tversky and Kahneman take
these results and others in their study to .be supportive of the notion
that people judge the frequency of a class by its availability. Availability is operationally defined as what is recalled. Famous names were
more easily recalled than less famous names, and so are judged to have
occurred more frequently than the less famous names.

9

Additional support for the availability heuristic comes from a
study by Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff (1977} in which Hebrew-speaking
students were asked to estimate the number of countries or kibbutzim
beginning with certain (Hebrew) letters. Measures of availability were
successful in predicting some estimates, including some errors, but
Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff caution that availability was not the only
determinant of judged frequency and suggest that other, situationspecific, factors also influenced frequency estimates. Specifically,
they suggest that a factor influencing their results was the subjects'
knowledge of the lexicographic structure of the language, and give the
example that "subjects may have known that 'Aleph' is a much more
popular initial letter than 'Yud', a factor which could have tempered
their reliance on availability information ••• " (p. 237). (Subjects may
know which is a more popular initial letter because generally they can
think of more words that start with one letter than the other; in
other words, they may have tempered their reliance on availability
information by utilizing other availability information.)
Lichtenstein; Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs (1978) examined frequency judgments for various causes of death. In Experiment l,
causes of death with varying frequencies of occurrence were paired (for
example, tuberculosis- flood}. Subjects were asked to judge which
cause of death was more likely and to give an estimate of how much more
likely the one cause of death was than the other. (Per year per one
hundred million

u.s.

residents, the frequency of tuberculosis is 1,800

and the frequency of flood is 100. Therefore, the ratio of occurrence
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of tuberculosis to flood would be 18:1.) Lichtenstein et al. found that,
for these relative frequency judgments, subjects generally were able to
identify the more frequent cause of death, as long as the true ratio
was 2:l or greater. Below 2:1, discrimination was often poor. Subjects
also displayed a tendency to underestimate large ratios. In Experiment 3,
Lichtenstein et al. had subjects make absolute estimates of the frequencies of 40 causes of death. To help them make their estimates,
subjects were given a standard: one group of subjects was told that the
frequency of death in the

u.s.

due to motor vehicle accidents was 50,000

per year; another group was told l,OOO deaths per year were caused by
electrocution. The resulting estimates, although highly correlated with
true frequency, were not substantially accurate. Bias was again found:
subjects underestimated high-frequency events and overestimated lowfrequency events. Lichtenstein et al. also report a secondary bias:
overestimation associated with highly publicized deaths (such as cancer,
homicide, tornado, etc.l and underestimation associated with undramatic, "quiet" deaths (_such as asthma, diabetes, tuberculosis, etc.).
Lichtenstein et al. suggest that one possible explanation for these
under- and overestimations can be found in the availability heuristic:
sensational, highly publicized deaths which are easy to recall are
judged to be very frequent, while causes of deaths, instances of which
are hard to recall, are judged to be infrequent.
The results of the depression studies can also be explained by
the availability neuristic. Lloyd and Lishman (1975) and Teasdale and
Fogarty (19791 have found that depressed subjects retrieve unpleasant
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memories to stimulus words more quickly than they retrieve pleasant
memories. Johnson, Petzel, Hartney, and Morgan (1981) have also reported
a differential recall effect for depressed and nondepressed subjects.
Subjects were given 20 different tasks - solving mazes, cancelling
vowels,, decoding messages, unscrambl.ing anagrams, etc • - and were
allowed. to complete half of the tasks, but were interrupted prior to
completion on the other half. White (1979} has argued that completion
of a task is intrinsically rewarding; therefore, subjects were assumed
to be reinforced on half the tasks and nonreinforced on the other half.
After administration of all tasks, the subjects were asked to write
down the names or descriptions of as many of the tasks as they could
recall. Johnson et al. found that depressed subjects recalled significantly more of th.e uncompleted (nonreinforced) tasks than the completed
~einforced.l

tasks. This finding was opposite of that for nondepressive

subjects who recalled significantly more completed than uncompleted
tasks. From these studies it can be seen that the information available
to the depressive is quite different from that which is available to
the nondepressive, and is in accordance with the reported frequency
judgments of depressives and nondepressives, i.e., depressives underestimate positive reinforcement Cit is less available) and nondepressives Cat least in one study - Nelson & Craighead, 1977) underestimate
amount of punishment (nonreinforcement- also less available).
Automaticity and Depression: Methodological Differences
In evaluating the effect of depression on sensiti.vity to frequency information, there are two sets of studies under consideration:

12

those studies that have been incorporated into and support Hasher and
Zacks' theory of automatic encoding (hereafter referred to as the
"frequency studtesn since these studies tend to focus on the frequency
judgments th.emselvesl_; and the lldepression studies" (labeled as such
since these studies use frequency judgments as a method of studying
depression!. Th.e results of these two sets of studies appear to conflict. This may not be the case, however, as there are several methodological differences between the sets. The two sets of studies differ
in the type of stimuli that

~re

presented, the type of judgment the

subject is required to make, and what is accepted as an accurate
judgment (see Table ll.
The stimuli that have been used in the frequency studies have
been innocuous, neutral items, usually common nouns. Hasher and Zacks
used pictures of common objects that would be familiar to young children.
The depression studies, on the other hand, require subjects to make
judgments about emotionally-charged events. For example, the subject
is required to tell how many times he was "right" or "wrong". The
subject's estimation is concerned with his performance on a task, and,
therefore, reflects back on him personally.
The studies also differ in the type of judgment the subject is
required to make. In the frequency studies, subjects make judgments of
item frequency. The subject is presented a list of items; throughout
the list, items are repeated varying number of times. The subject is
then required to estimate the frequency of occurrence of each individual
item. In the depression studies, (and also in studies of availability),
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Table l
Major Methodological Differences
Frequency Studies

Depression Studies

Stimuli

innocuous

emotionally-charged

Judgment Required

item frequency

category frequency

Accuracy of JUdgment

relative accuracy

absolute accuracy

14

subjects make judgments of category frequency. The subject is presented
a list of items, none of which are repeated. The subject is required to
respond to each. ttem, and then is given "success/failure" feedback on
his response. After presentation of the items, subjects are required to
estimate

~e

frequency of one of the feedback categories: either the

frequency of their successes, or the frequency of their failures.
The dtfference between the studies as to what is accepted as an
accurate judgment has also contributed to the apparent ¢onflict of
results·. The frequency studies accepted as accurate those judgments
that were accurate in a relative sense. That is, items with an actual
frequency of five are judged to be more frequent than items with an
actual frequency of three. However, these judgments were not always
accurate in an absolute sense: as the actual frequency of the items
increased, so did the discrepancy between actual frequency and judged
frequency. This has been reported by others; for example, Hintzman
(19691 found that judged frequency increased with the log of true
frequency. The depression studies, on the other hand, have reported
their results only in terms of absolute accuracy. The results show,
however, that relative judgments of frequency are accurate for both
depressed and nondepressed people; that is, both depressives and
nondepressives report higher frequencies of reinforcement than punishment when they have been reinforced more, and higher frequencies of
punishment tlta,n reinforcement wh.en they have been punished more. It
:i:.s in the absol.ute judgrnents of frequency that the differences between
depressed. and nondepressed persons are found. For example, in the

15

Nelson and Craighead (19771 study in which the subject had been reinforced 28 times, the mean frequency judgments for the depressed subjects
was 22.5, while for the nondepressed subjects, it was 29.5. While the
no~epressives

were accurate in

cantly different from 281, the
reinforcement they had

rece~ved

t~eir

judgments (29.5 was not signifi-

depreS&~ves

underestimated the amount of

(22.5 was significantly different from

28 and from 29.• SL 1\fteJ:: recei-ving 12 punishment trials, the mean

frequency judgment for the depressives- was l3, while for the nondepressives, i t was 7 .62. !n this: case, th.e depress-ives were accurate in
their judgments· of frequency while the nondepressives significantly
underestimated the actual amount.
These differences in methodology suggest that the frequency
studies and the depression studies may be investigating different
phenomena. If this is the case, then the results of these studies may
not necessarily be contradictory.
Automaticity and Availability: A Reexamination of Theory
The results of the frequency studies may be explained by Hasher
and Zacks' concept of

automaticity~

the results of the depression

studies may be explained by Tversky and Kahneman's availability heuristic. The studies themselves have been

reexamined~

the roles that auto-

maticity and availability play in judgments of frequency of occurrence
also need to be reexamined and evaluated. In this reexamination, it is
i'lnportant

t~

note that "automatic processes" are concerned only with

the encoding of information, while the availability heuristic is used
only in the retrieval of information.
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If frequency information is automatically encoded as Hasher and
Zacks propose, and if it is_ stored and retrieved just as it is encoded,
then mood state Gind many other variables) would have no effect on
judgments of frequency, either relative or absolute (this is inherent
in Hasher and Zacks' defini-tion>:. This is, of course, not what has been
found: absolute frequency

jud~ents

can be affected by depression.

Therefore, mextJory for frequency information must be faulty in at least
one of its three phases: encoding, s-torage, or retrieval.
EncQding of frequency information may not, of course, be an
automatic process. If the concept of automatic encoding is completely
rejected,

~owever,

For example, one of

it becomes difficult to explain certain findings.
t~e

components of the concept of

automatic~ty

is

that "automatic proceases do not require either awareness or intention,
and their operation cannot be willfully inhibited" (Hasher & Zacks,
p. 3591. rf thts is rejected, can a reasonable argument be made that,
in tQeir day--to-day living, people nave tried to keep track of the
frequencies of words, letters-, and bigrams? Clearly, the concept of
automaticity cannot be rejected totally. It is useful to accept the
idea that

~e

processing of frequency information is automatic in that

it is a conttnuous process not requiring awareness and intention. However, this does not exclude the possibility that processing can be
affected by

ma~ t~ngs.

For example, processing may be affected by

selective attentton. rndeed, Hasher and Zacks state that processing
occurs on

•t~tever

information is the focus of attention" (p. 359}.

Given an array of information, if it is not in the interest of a person
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to pay equal attention to all parts of the array, all parts of the
array may not be equally encoded, and judgments about that array may
be distorted. A depressive who construes the world, himself, and the
future in a

neg~tive

way (Beck, l974l finds support for his views in

his failures- and the negative aspects of the world and life. Seeking
confirmation of our views may lead to selective attention, and this
may lead to differential encoding, which would result in distorted
judgments of frequency wh..en the judgments must be made on all the
information, not just that to wnich we attended. I t is not clear
wh.ethe.r th.:i::s has produced the distorted absolute frequency judgments
reported in the depression literature since the relative frequency
judgments were not silnilarly distorted.
Even if frequency information is encoded automatically, it is
unlikely that the information is retrieved exactly as it is encoded.
Retrieval of information may be distorted, for example, by the person's
expectations or biases. Loftus (1975} has shown that eyewitnesses who
were asked "leading questions" following the witnessed event later
distorted information about the event in the direction of the biased
leading question. If a depressive is biased towards negativity, this
bias could affect accuracy when retrieving frequency information about
hedonically charged events (e.g., underestimating the amount of reinforcement received

~

Nelson & Craighead, 1977) • An opposite bias can be

seen in nondepresstves. Edwards (cited in Anastasi, 1976) has shown
that the tendency to choose socially desirable responses on self-report
inventor~

is not necessarily indicative of deliberate deception.

People have a tendency to want to .. look good" and this bias lMY have

18

caused

t~e

di$torted frequency judgments found in the nondepressives

by Nelson and Craighead Cnondepressives underestimated the amount of

punisl'unent - \dl..tch was indicative of failure - they had received}. As
effort towards retrieval ismintmized, these biases should have less of
an effect on the. fre-quency judgments. For

exam~;>le,

there may be consider-

able. effort involved in retrieving the t.tem frequencies needed to make
a judgment of category frequency, but retrieval is minimzied when only
an item judgment is called for. In other words, expectations or biases
should have little or no effect on item judgments, but should affect
category judgments,.
Clearly, automaticity and availability need not be viewed as
rival

approac~es

information.

T~ey

to the question of how judgments are made for frequency
sh.ould instead be viewed as approaches explaining

the processing of frequency information at different stages of that
processing.
The Present Experiment
The difference in methodology between the frequency studies and
the depression studies leaves an ambiguous situation. With these differences, the two sets of studies are not directly comparable, and
nothing conclusive can be stated about the effect of mood state on
judgments of frequency of occurrence. The present study intends to
link

t~ese

sets of studies and cla:t:'ify this issue.

Two of ~e. ll).ethological differences W'ill be mani~;>ulated: the.

type of st.bnuli use.d Cinnocuous/emotionally-chargedl, and the type of
judgment made by the subject (item/category judgment}. (The third
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difference. - what t.s acce.pte.d as an accurate. judgment - will also be
examined, but, <mvt.ously does not nee.d to be manipulated.} Statements
of self-re.ferenc:;e W'tll be. used as stimuli. Rec:;ent studies (Bower
Gill~an,

1979; Rogers, KuiJ?e.r,

self-reference tn

memor~. ~~~

&

&

Kirker, 19771 have investigated

found that information judged in refer-

ence to oneself is remembered better than when it is judged in reference
to

ano~er

person. In this study, statements of self-reference will be

used to create emottonally-charge.A and innocuous stimuli. Three categories of self-reference. statements will be used: positive, negative,
and neutral.
"~

~amples

failure.~,

am a

"~

of th.e.ae would be respectively: "! am fine",

like. to

watc~

TVn.

~he

frequency studies have

used only innocuous stimuli.; th.e depression studies used emotionallyc:::~arge.d

stimuli.

~ne

present experiment will use both types of stimuli

in one. experiment (innocuous stimuli: neutral statements; emotionallycharged stimuli: positive. and negative statements} so that any differences caus.ed by the. tn>e. of stimuli can be examined. As the statements
also fall into distinct categories (positive, negative, and neutral),
~e

second methodological difference between the frequency studies can

be. inveat:.tgate.d. :tn th.e. frequency studies, subjects made item judgments,

while in the. depre.asion studt.es, subjects made category judgments.
Judgments of frequency of occurrence for each of the statements can be
gathered, as well as judgments of frequency of occurrence for each
category of statements .. <J:h.ese judgments of item frequency and category
frequency can th.en be compared directly.
<J:o a certain degree, the issue of automaticity and availability
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will also be ~ddressed. As previously discussed, when retrieval of
frequency information is- minilnized (as in item judgments}, the effect
of biases- and expeGtat.tons- of the judgments w-ill also be minimized.
Therefore, the effect of any

bias~

that depressives have toward nega-

tivity and negattve statements or non.depressives have toward positive
statements (for examplel. W't.ll be mini:mized when they are making judgments- C!.lf item frequency. Judgments for positive and

neg~tive

items

should, th.erefore, be as accurate as· judgments for neutral items. However, wflen retrieval is- not min:btized, as when making category judgments,
the availability of information should influence frequency judgments.
Biases and expectations may influence availability and, therefore, have
an effect on the judgments.. That is, overestimation and underestimation

may occur in categoq judgments of positive and negative items, but
should not occur in category judgments of neutral items. Any biases
of the depressed and nondepressed subjects in this study should, then,
show their effect in the judgments of category frequency but not in the
judgments C!.lf item frequency.
It is hypothesized: 1} For item frequency judgments, the only
significant effect should be for the actual frequency of the items,
i.e., as the actual frequency increases, so should the frequency estimates. Since retrieval is minimized wnen making item frequency judgments,
any biases- caused hy mood and/or statement type should have no effect ..
2L For category frequency judgments, it is hypothesized that the interaction of mood state and statement type will be significant. Since
retrieval is not minilnized when judging category frequencies, these
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judgments could be affected hy biases caused by depression. These
biases snould also appear WQen subjects recall the items. According to
tne availabiltty neuristic, judgments of category frequency are made
based on
frequency
recalled

~e

availability of information. I£ after making category

judgment~
~ould

be

tne subject is asked to recall the items, the items

~ose

whicn

~e

sUbject had available to him, i.e.,

th.ose on wh.tch. h.e based nis judgments of category frequency. Therefore,
it is hypothesized th.at

3t the analysis of the recall data will mimic

tne analysis of tne category frequency judgments, i.e., the interaction
of mood and statement type. wtll be stgnificant.

METHOD

Subjects,
Stxty-faur undergraduate students enrolled in introductory
psych.ology courses- partictpated tn th.e experiment as part of a course
requtrement .. All subje.cts h.ad be.en given the Beck Depression Inventory

OSOr: Beck,

1967L prtor to participattng in the experiment. Thirty-two

subjects wtth.
32 subjects

BD~

~~

scores of ten or above were designated as depressed;

BDr scores of four or less were designated as nondep-

ressed.
Lists
Three types of statements were used as stimuli: positive selfreference statements, negative self-reference statements, and neutral
self-reference statements. Twelve statments of each type were composed
to make a pool of 36 statements. The neutral statements were of the
basic form "r like (object or activity}", e.g., "I like chocolate ice
cream", "I like to ice skate". Th.e positive and negative statements
were created as follows: 12 positive adjectives (e.g., "enthusiastic")
and

~2

negattve adjectives (_e.g., "discouraged") were selected from the

Depression

~djecttve

Check List (OACL; Lubin, 1967). These adjectives

were used in statements of the basic form "I (am/feel} (adjective)",
e.g., ":t feel discouraged'1 , "I am unhappy", "I am an easy-going person".
(See Appendix

~

for a list of all stimuli.}

Ustng these statements, eigh.t lists were constructed, each containing 69 statements. Four of the lists contained 10 different positive
22
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statements, l l different

neutra~

statements, and 12 different negative

statements; the other four lists contained 10 different negative statements, 11 different

neutra~

statements. Therefore, the

statements, and 12 different positive
frequenc~

gories was either 10, 11, or 12 (see

of occurrence of each of the cateTab~e

2).

Each individual statement also had a frequency of occurrence in
the list of one, two, three, or four. In the category from which 10
items were included in the list, three items occurred in the list only
one time, three items occurred two times, three items occurred three
times, and one item occurred four times. In the neutral category, which
always had 11 items included in the list, four items occurred one time,
three occurred two times,

three occurred three times, and one item

occurred four times. In the category from which 12 items were included
in the list, five items occurred one time, three occurred two times,

three occurred three times, and one item

occurred four times. Therefore,

there were 22 occurrences of 10 items from either the positive or negative category, 23 occurrences of 11 items from the neutral category,
and 24 occurrences of 12 items from either the negative or positive
category (see Table 3}.
The

~ists

were constructed so that approximately one-third of

the occurrences from each of the categories fell into each third of
the list. Specifically, of the 22 occurrences of 10 items, seven occurred in tne first third of the list, eight in the second third, and
seven in the last third; of the 23 occurrences of the 11 neutral items,
eight occurred in the first third, seven in the second third, and eight
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Table 2
Number of Unique Statements from Each Category
Category
Positive

Neutral

Negative

(4 lists1

10

11

12

(4 li:sts1

12

11

10
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Table 3
Construction of the Lists: Number of Different Statements from
Each

Catego~

by their Frequency of Occurrence in the List
Category

Frequency

Positive

Neutral

Negative

J.

3

4

5

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

4

l

1

1

1

5

4

3

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

4

1

1

1

(4 listsl

(4 listsl
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in the last third; and, of the 24 occurrences of the 12 items, eight
occurred in each third of the list. With this restriction, and with
the restriction that the same item would not occupy adjacent positions,
the occurrences were randomly assigned to positions in the list.
Eight lists were constructed, four with the category frequencies
10-positive, 11-neutral, 12-negative; and four with the category frequencies 12-positi:ve, ll-neutral, 10-negative. Four lists were constructed of each so that each statement would have occurred in the lists with
a frequency of one, two, three, and four.
Procedure
Subjects were instructed that they would see a list of statements and that they were to rate each statement on a 20-point scale
for the truthfulness of the sentence as it applied to them (20 -

state~

ment is completely true; l - statement is completely false) • The subjects were informed that all the statements would ask about themselves;
subjects were told to rate the statements as they applied to how they
felt "right now, today ... The subjects were also told that some of the
statements would be repeated and that the statements were repeated so
that the subjects' consistency in rating could be checked. Subjects
were cautioned to rate every statement that was presented.
The list of statements was then presented to the subjects using
a Kodak Carousel projector. Each statement was presented for 6 sec.
After presentation of the list, the rating sheets were collected, and
the subjects- made their frequency judgments.
One group of subjects (16 depressed and 16 nondepressedl were
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required to make judgments of item frequency. They were given 42
statements and were asked to tell how many times each statement had
appeared in

~e li~t.

The 42 statements consisted of the 33 different

statements presented tn the ltst plus nine new statements. (The response
forms used i:n the experiment are presented in Appendix B.)
T~e

other group of subjects (16 depressed and 26 nondepressedl

were required to make judgments of category frequency. The subjects
were told the three categories, i.e., statements concerning positive
qualities, statements concerning negative qualities, and statements
concerning what they like. Examples of each of the categories were
gtven; these were, respectively: "I feel fine", "I am a failure",
"I like to watch TV". Subjects were then asked to estimate the number
of different statements, not the number of total statements (statements
with repetitionsl, presented in each category. After making these
estimates. subjects were asked to recall as many of the statements as
possible.

RESULTS
Mood State.
The subjects were pre-selected for the experiment on the basis of
their scores on the. Beck

Depressi~n

Inventory (BDI}. The mean BDI scores

are presented in Table 4. As the BDr was given to the subjects several
weeks prior to parttcipation in the experiment, a ratings scales score
was calculated. for each. subject to serve as· a manipulation check on the
mood state of th.e subject. During the experiment, subjects rated the
positive, negative, and neutral self-reference statements on a 20-point
scale with a rating of l indicating that the statement was completely
false, and. a rating of 20 meaning the statement was completely true. A
ratings score for each subject was calculated. by the formula:
p

2::

(21-Pi}

+ i=l
p

where RS is the ratings score, Ni is the average rating of a negative
statement across its repetitions, n is the number of different negative
statements presented, Pi is the average rating of a positive statement
across its repetitions, and p is the number of different positive statements presented.. (Ratings of the neutral statements are ignored in the
calculation of the RS score as the statements, by their very nature,
were intended to be statements associated with neither depression nor
nondepression.l In effect, this formula creates scores such that those
subjects who gave

~~h.

ratings to negative statements (rating those
28
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Table. 4

Mean Depress-ion Scores
RS*
Depressed
n=32

Nondepressed.
n=32

*

~4.4~

(14.62}**

17.55

(1.9.241

c 1.52}

11.31

(10.40)

Cn=26L
~.63

Cn=29)_

BDI: = Beck Depression Inventory;
RS = s~ores computed from responses on the ratings scales

** In parentheses are the mean scores after "inconsistent"
subjects have been removed..
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statements to be. truel and low ratings to positive statements (rating
those statelllents to be falsel will have high RS scores; those subjects
who gave hi:g-h_ rati-ngs to positive. statements (those are tr-uel_ and low
ratings to negative statements (those are false} will have low RS
scores.

RS score i-ndicates that the subject rated himself nega-

~ hi~h

tively, wh.tle, a loW' RS score indicates that he rated himself positively.
The mean RS· scores: are presented in Table 4.
The RS

s~ores

were used as a manipulati-on check of the mood state

of the subject. Any nondepressed subject whose RS score was above the
mean RS score of the depressed group, and any depressed subject whose R5
score was below the mean RS score of the nondepressed group were excluded from the. analyses of the data on the basis that, at the time of
the

experi~ent,

the- mood of those subjects was no longer at one of the

extremes (either depressed or nondepressed) for which the subject had
been pre-selected. Nine subjects - s-ix depressed (two in the item frequency judgment group and four in the category frequency judgment group)
and three

nondepress~d

(two in the item frequency group and one in the

category frequency groupl - were excluded from the analyses on this
basi's.. Table. 4 shows in parentheses the mean BDI and RS scores for the
groups after these subjects have been removed. All analyses of the data
were performed

fi~st

wrth. all

th~

subjects and then again with these

subjects removed. As: the resu,!ts of the. an.alyses of the data using all
the subjects- were_ llasi'Cally· the same as tAe analy-ses with subjects removed, reported, results· will be of analyses using all subjects. Results
of analyses-wi-th subjects removed follow in parentheses.
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Item Judgments
In making

ju~gments

of item frequency, subjects were required

to provide estilna.tes for 42 items - 33 "old'l statements and nine "new"
statements. Each statement was categorized by statement type (positive,
negative, neutralL and by actual frequency of occurrence (0, 1, 2, 3,
or 4L The number of st.atements in each. cell of this categorization
ranged from one. to five. Therefore, the item judgment analyses were
based on the subjectts mean frequency estimate for each cell. (These
cell means are presented in Appendix C.l
The item judgments were analyzed by a 2 (mood state) X 3 (statement typel X 4 Gactual frequencyl analysis of variance with repeated
measures on the last two factors (so that it would be comparable to
Hasher and Zackst (19791 item frequency analysis, zero-frequency items
were excluded from this analysis}. As hypothesized, for judgments of
item frequency, the only significant effect was for the actual frequency
of the items, !:_(3,901
~

(.3, 781 = l29.96,

= l05.02, £..< .Ol

£..< .Oll.

(see Table 5} (subjects removed:

As actual frequency of the items increased,

so did the e.stimated frequency. There was no difference between the
depressed and nondepressed subjects in their estimates, !_<1 (see
Figure 11. These results are similar to those reported by Hasher and
Zacks. Also as hypothesized, statement type (positive, negative, or
neutrall had no effect on judgments of item frequency,

!_~1,

nor were

any of the interactions significant.
A 2 Gftood statel X 3 (_statement typel analysis of variance with
J::epeated measures on the las·t factor was performed on the zero frequency
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Table 5

Analys.is of Variance of Item Frequency Judgments CAll Subjects)

ss

df

MS

F

Between S\:lbjects
6.28

1

6.28

387.34

30

12.91

T (Statement 'l'ypel

0.42

2

0.21

<1

MT

0.45

2

0.2"2

<1

38.66

60

0.64

338.85

3

112.95

1.90

3

0.63

96.79

90

1.08

TA

5.64

6

0.94

MTA

0.83

6

0.14

83.6.1

180

0.46

M (}tood Stater
S(}tl

<'1

Within Subjects

TS (}tl
A (Actual Prequencyl
MA

AS (}11

TAS (}tl

*

£,.<-Ol

105 .01*
<1

2.00
<1
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Actual Frequency

Figure l.

Item frequency estimates for depressed and nondepressed subjects.
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items. This

~nalysis

revealed a significant effect for statement type,

~ (2,601 ~ 13.91, £~.01.

action were not
positive

The main effect of mood state and the inter-

si~n±ficant

zero-f~equency

(see Table 61. As can be seen in Figure 2,

statements were much more likely to be estimated

as having occurred previousl¥ than were negative and neutral zerofrequency statements.
Category Judgments
The judgments of categeJ;y' frequency were analyzed by a 2 (mood
statel. X 2

Cli~t

type[ X 3 (statement type} analysis of variance with

repeated measures on the last factor. There were two list types in the
experiment: the list consisted of either 10 positive statements, 11
neutral statements, and 12 negative statements, or it consisted of
12 positive, l l neutral, and 10 negative statements. Although there

were actual differences in the category frequencies between lists, the
analysis of variance revealed that list type had no effect on the category judgments, F (1,281

~

1.63,

E.~

.OS.

It was hypothesized that the interaction of mood and statement
type would have a significant effect on judgments of category frequency.
This was not the case; the interaction was not significant, F· (2, 56)
l.53, E.> .OS (see Table 7l (subjects removed:

~ <1).

There was no

si-gnificant main effect for mood, F'"'- 1 (subjects removed:
l.l8,

~~.051,

cant, F (2,561

=

~ (1,

23)

=

however, the main effect for statement type was signifi~

4.29, E.<.OS (subjects

removed:~

(2,46}

= 4.79,

E. <.OSl. Examination of the overall mean estimates for the three cate-

gories of statement type revealed that positive statements were judged

35

Table 6

Analysis of Variance of Judgments of
Zero-Frequency Items (All Subjects)

ss

df

MS

F

Between Subjects
<1

M (}1ood Statel

0.03

1

0.03

S(Ml

4.47

30

0.15

T (Statement Typel

3Q5l

2

1.76

13. 91*

MT

0.07

2

0.04

<1

TS(Ml

7.58

60

0.13

Within Subjects

* £.< .Ol
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Figure 2.

Frequency est~tes for zero-frequency items from each
category.
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Table 7
Analys~s

of Variance of Category Frequency Judgments [All Subjects}

ss

df

MS

F

Between Subjects
M (Mood Statel

123.76

.l

123.76

<1

L {J..ist Typel

207.09

1

207.09

1.63

82.5J.

1

82.51

3553.63

28

126.92

T (Statement Typel

298.90

2

149.45

4.29*

MT

106.64

2

53.32

1.53

LT

16.94

2

8.47

...:::"1

MLT

45.02

2

22.51

<1

1952.50

56

34.87

ML

soor

<1

Within Subjects

TS U.U.l

* .e_<.os
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to be most frequent
next frequent
be the least

ex = ~6.061,

ex = ~4.161,
fre~ent

these means indicated

negative statements were judged to be

and neutral statements were always judged to

category (X=
t~t

~.751.

A Newman-Keuls analysis of

the means for both positive and negative

statements were significantly different from the mean of the neutral
statements, but that the means of the positive and negative statements
did not differ stgnificantly.
Recall
The

~ecall

data was analyzed by a 2 (mood state} X 2 (list type)

X 3 (statement typel analysis of variance with repeated measures on the
last factor.
It had been hypothesized that the analysis of the recall data
would mimic the analysis of the category frequency judgments, i.e., it
was hypothesized that the interaction of mood state and statement type
would be significant. In the analysis including all subjects, this
interaction just reached significance,

~

(2,56}

= 3.13, £ = .05

(see

Table 8L. w.Qen subjects were removed from this analysis, instead of
increasing this interaction (removal of subjects "inconsistent" in
their mood state

~ould

lead to more homogeneous groups and increase

the differences between the groupsl, the interaction dropped below
significance,

~

C2,46l

= 3.02,

~

= .06. It is debatable, therefore,

wh.ethe.r thi:s intel:'action. can be considered real. Figure 3 presents the
mean number of statements recalled in each category. Simple effects and
Newman-Keul~

analyses indicated that, if real, the interaction lies in

the recall of the neutral statements. Recall did not differ signifi-
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Table 8
Analysis of Variance of Recall Data (All Subjects)

ss

df

MS

F

M (Mood State}

3.62

1

3.62

1.50

L (List Typel

7.88

1

7.88

3.26

ML

7.95

1

7.95

3.29

67.91

28

2.42

T (Statement Type}

70.96

2

35.48

17.29**

MT

12.84

2

6.42

3.13*

LT

4.96

2

2.48

1.21

MLT

1.90

2

0.95

<1

114.91

56

2.05

Between Subjects

S~l

Within Subjects

TS (MLl

*

12. =.05

** 12.< .0.1
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6

CJ
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~

Nondepressed

5

«<

4

u

CD

e:r:
c
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3

CD

:E
2

1

Positive

Negative
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Statement Type

Pi911re. 3.

Mea.n number of statements recalled in each category for
depressed and nondepressed subjects.
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cantly between positive

~nd

negative statements or between depressives

and nondepress.i;:ve.s for these statements. There was, however, a significant difference between depressives and nondepressives for recall of
the neutral statements. Also, recall of neutral statements differed
significantly from recall. of both positive and negative statements for
nondepresstves, whtle recall of neutral statements differed from recall
of negative statements GPut not from positive statements} for depressives.
The anAlysis of the recall data did mimic the analysis of the
category judgments in that the main effect of statement type was signif!icant (}' (2, 561

~

.17 .. 29,

£_

< . 011,

and no other main effect or inter-

action was significant (wtth. the possible exception of the mood state
by statement type interaction} • However, the pattern of recall for
statements of various types did not mimic the pattern of category estimates as should follow from the availability heuristic. In the category
judgments, positive. and negative statements were judged to have occurred
more frequently than neutral statements. If category judgments are
based on what is available to the subject, as suggested by the availability heuristic, then what was avilable to the subject should have
been positive and negative. statements. However, neutral statements were
recalled the. most (X
were. recalled

~

5 .. 001, while positive and negative statements

nth. approxi:mately

equal frequency (Xpositive= 3.21,

Xnega.t=--··
==~ 3 .~SL .. A Newma.n-K.e.uls analysis: indicated the difference
l..."ve
between the. neutral statements and the. positive and negative statements
to be. s:ignifrcant, while the difference between the positive statements
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and the negative sta.tements was not significant. This Newman-ICeuls
mimics the Newman-ICeuls for category judgments in that positive and
negat±ve statements do not differ, but they do differ from neutral
statements. Contrary to th.e availability heuristic, however, the more
that was available to th.e subject (.i.e .. ~ recalled} , the ·lower was the

frequency

es:t~te ..

DISCUSSION

Individually, the results of the item judgments and the results
of the category judgments are important for various theories concerning
the process-ing of frequency information. Taken together, it was hoped
that they would clarify and/or resolve the apparent conflict of results
between t.he frequency literature and the depression literature. In
short, the results· were not able to resolve the conflict, did provide
support for one the.ory but problems for another, and suggested a reconciliation of the two theories.
The present study attempted to clarify the effect of mood state
on judgments of frequency of occurrence by linking two apparently conflicting sets of results through the methodological differences between
the studies producing those results. Briefly, Hasher and Zacks (1979}
propose that the encoding of frequency information is an automatic
process and cannot be affected by depression; this is in conflict with
the depression literature which has shown that depression can affect
judgments of the frequency of reinforcement and/or punishment. The
methodological differences between the studies (type of stimuli used,
type of judgment required} we.re hypothesized to be the cause of this
apparent conflict. The.refore, an attempt was made to replicate both
Hashe.r and Zacks' resu].ts and the results of the depression studies in
one
been

e~pertment.
sh.o~

Had both of these results replicated, it would have

that judgments· of the same information appeared to be both
43
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affected and not affected by depression, depending

~n

the type of

judgments required. Unfortunately, both results were not replicated.
Hasher and Zacks-' results. were replicated in the item judgments (mood
did n0t affect ttem judgments}, l>ut the category judgments did not
replicate. the results· 0f the depression literature (i.e., that depression affects categsry judgmentsl. Although the results of the depression
literature were not replicated and i.t was· not shown that depression
affected the category judgments wh.ile not affecting the item judgments
thereby· caustng an apparent conflict, the possibility that this could
happen cannot be ruled out.
effect.

~pe

rn

fact, another variable had this very

of statement (positive, negative, or neutral) had no effect

on item judgments, while it did have an effect on category judgments:
the positive and negative statements were estimated as occurring more
frequently than neutral statements. I'f one variable can produce this
apparent

confli~t bet~een ite~

and category judgments, it is likely

that other vartables (e.g., mood statel may also be capable of producing
thxs apparent conflict. It is proposed that depression did not have
this effect in th.e pre.sent study because the stimuli used (self-reference statelllEUltsl were not information that is affected by mood state.
!n other WOJ'dS·, pa,ting self-reference statements is not equivalent to

the experience of :;'einforcement/punis:hment used in the depression
studies. Had

sti~li

of this nature been used, the possibility exists

that while depression would be shown to have an effect on judgments of
category frequency,

judgments~

of item frequency would remain unaffected.

A,lthQU<;Jh the :results of the present study could not resolve the
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issue of now' aepression relates to juagments of frequency, it is important to

ex~ne

them in terms of their relationship to various

theories concerning fre.quency juagments. To be specific, the present
results bear on Hasher and Zacks' theory of the automaticity of frequency encoding, a,nd on Tversky a,nd l<ahneman's (l973l availability
heuristic.
Hash_er and Zacks·' theroy- that the encoding of frequency is an
automatic process and cannot be affected by depression was supported
by the results of the item judgments. It is important to note, however,
that Hasher and Zacks' theory found support only in judgments of item
frequency·. A.lth<!>Ugh judC)ltl9nts. of category· frequency were not affected
by depression, neither did they follow the pattern expected if frequency
encoding is an autGmatic process. In an experiment by Alba, Chromiak,
Hasher, and Attig l1.9.80}_, judgments· of category frequency increasea as
the actual frequency of category·

~emplars

increased. They concluded

from this that category· frequency· was· automatically encoded. However,
for the category judgments· in the present experiment, the list type by
statement type interaction was not significant. This indicates that
the. actual

~re<ttlency

when making tne

of statements .in each category made no difference

catego~y

and in the I>res.ent

judgments:. In Rasher and Zacks • Experiment 3

~peri111ent,

esti'1Qates of item frequency increased

wi·th actual fre<Nency. This did not occur in the estimates of category
frequency. Not only dia actQal f:r:equency 1l)ake no aifference, but the
category· judgments·we:r:e affected by the type of information that made
up the category (J:he positive and negative categories we:r:e given highe:r:
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estimates. than the. neutral category regardless of actual frequency}.
This would. not be expected if frequency was automatically encoded and
was retrieved as tt had been encoded.
'!'h~

res.>Ults:- of the category judgments, along with the recall

data, also pres-ent a problem for '!'versky and ICahneman's availability
heuristic.

~c~ord.ing

to the availability heuristic, judgments of fre-

quency are 11,1ade on the basi'S: of ava.i:labili:ty, i.e., the ease with which
relevant i'nstances> come to mi:nd.. 1\vai:labi:li:ty has always been· operationally defined as,what

i~·

recalled.

rn

the present experiment, con-

trary to what wQUld be predicted by the availability heuristic, the
more that was· recalled from a category, the lower was the estimated
frequency of that category. Obviously, frequency was not estimated on
the basis of what could be recalled after making the estimates (presumably recalling the information on which the estimates were based) •
Nor are frequency estimates made on the basis of what can be recalled
before making the estimates. Curt and Zechmeister {1981) had subjects
recall items prior to making frequency estimates. It was found that the
estimates were affected by this initial task and that recall did not
predict the pattern of frequency
recall i:tems
probleJt~

pri~r

to

~ing

~sti~tes

their

made by subjects who did not

esti~tes.

Thes-e results indicate a

in defining availabi·li'ty solely in terms of recall.

Not only do the

re~lts·

of the categQry jud.9I!Jents and recall

indicate a problem in defining availability,

b~t

the res.ults of the

categQry jud<Jlllents. also lend support to Beyth.-Marom and Fischhoff's
{l977l proposi-tion that availability is not the only determinant of
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judged frequency. In their study, it appeared that category judgments
were influenced by their subjects' knowledge of the lexicographic
structure of the language. Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff suggest that
situation-specific factors such as this can influence frequency estimates. A situati'On-specific factor may have influenced the category
judgments in the present study. Matlin (cited in Matlin, 1979), in a
study investigating estimates of the background frequency of pleasant,
neutral, and unpleasant words, found that subjects gave lower frequency
estimates for neutral words than for pleasant or unpleasant words.
Essentially the same results were found in the present study. Estimates
of the situational

frequency of neutral items were significantly lower

than estimates of positive and negative items (which did not differ} •
It appears that a bias towards estimating emotionally-charged (pleasant
and unpleasant} items as occurring with a greater frequency than innocuous lneutrall items could have influenced the category judgments
in this study.
The results of the present study suggest that both Hasher and
Zacks' theory of the automaticity of frequency encoding and Tversky
and Kahnemants availability heuristic need to be amended. The automaticity theory should specify that it is applicable only to judgments of
item frequency and not t.o judgments of category frequency. (Although
Alba et al. (19801 concluded from their results that category frequency
is

automati~ally

encoded, in their study only neutral stimuli were

used, they did not address themselves to the results of the depression
literature, and they based their conclusion solely on the fact that
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categories with more exemplars in the list were reported to have occurred more frequently than categories with fewer exemplars (relative
frequency judgments} • Using this

crit~rion,

the same conclusion would

be drawn from the results of the depression studies since both depressives and nondepressives report higher frequencies of reinforcement
when they have been reinforced more, and higher frequencies of punishment when they have been punished more (see Review of the Relevant
Literature, pps. 14-15}. What needs to be explained is the systematic
distortions that occur in certain types of frequency information for
certain people. These distortions were not discussed by Alba et al.,
and would not have been expected to appear in a study, such as theirs,
in which only neutral stimuli were used.) The availability heuristic
needs to redefine "availability" and account for other factors that
influence frequency judgments besides availability. Though the results
of the present study suggest these changes in theory, they also suggest
and support a reconciliation of the two theories. Since the automaticity
theory is concerned only with the encoding of frequency information and
the availability heuristic is used only in the retrieval of information,
the two theories should be viewed not as rival approaches, but as two
approaches explaining different stages in the processing of frequency
information. The two theories can then be reconciled into a more complete theory of the processing of frequency information. In this reconciliation, it is theorized that frequency information about individual
items is encoded automatically. Since the frequency of individual items
is encoded, the effort towards retrieval of this information (item
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judgments} is minimized and the judgments are relatively accurate. On
the other hand, category frequencies are not encoded automatically. A
single item could be part of many different categories (e.g., pleasantness vs. unpleasantness, high vs. low imagery, short word vs. long word,
whether the item describes my cat or not, etc.}, and categories to which
the item may belong may not even be known until many items have been
presented. It is doubtful that frequency information is automatically
encoded for each of the many different categories into which an item
could belong. Therefore, to make an estimate of the frequency of items
occurring in a particular category, considerable effort is required: A
search through all the items is necessary to find those items that make
up the category. The frequencies of these items must then be retrieved
and this information complied. As this process takes place, many factors
could influence the final estimate: for example, the availability of
the searched-for items, biases peculiar to the type of information
involved (situation-specific facotrs), or the person's expectations or
biases about the information and the task he is asked to perform. Factors such as these could distort the final category judgment so that it
would appear that the information had not been automatically encoded.
The results of the present study support this proposed reconciliation
of the two theories: the item judgments were accurate while the category
judgments were not, and the category judgments could have been biased
by a general tendency to estimate higher frequencies for emotionallycharged items than for innocuous items.
The preceding reconciliation of the two theories provides a more
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complete model of the processing of frequency information. Needless to
say, further research is now needed to substantiate this model.
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APPENDIX A
Positive Self-Reference Statements
I am

a hea.lthy person.

I feel opt.:Unisti:c ..
I

am lucky.

I am a lively person ..

I am enthusiastic,
I feel alert,
I

feel light-hearted ..

I

am composed.

I

feel bright.

I feel peaceful.

I

am an easy-going pel; son ..

I feel light.

Negative Self--Reference Statements
unhappy.

I

feel dejected.

I

am

I

am discouraged.

I

am exhausted.

I feel burdened.

I

am a moody person.

I feel chained.

I am weary.

I am crestfallen.

I

feel gloomy.

I

feel miserable.

I

feel alone.

Neutral Self-Reference Statements
I

like chocolate ice cream.

I like to ice skate.

I

like rases.

I like science fiction stories·.

I like to sa to movies.

I like to sleep.

I. like to I;"ead ..

I

I like cats· ..

r like summer.

I

like th._e calor green.

like to go to the zoo.

r like to jag.

APPENDIX B
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APPENDIX B
Response. Form for Judgments of Item Frequency
I feel alert.

~

I am enthusiastic.

I like summer.

I am unhappy.

I am a moody person.

I am unfeeling •

I like strawberries.

I am composed.

I like science fiction stories.

I like to re.ad.

I feel dejected.

I am discouraged.

I like to jog.

I like to sleep.

I feel burdened.

I like to ski.

I feel bright.

I feel alive.

I like to ice skate.

I feel optimistic.

I am hopeful.

I feel peaceful.

I am weary.

I like chocolate ice cream.

I am a healthy person.

I am lucky.

I am an easy-going person.

I feel alone.

I feel chained.

I like the.. color green.

I like to go to the zoo.

I am exhausted.

I like cats.

I like, rose.s.

I feel poor.

I feel 111iserable.•

I feel light-hearted.

I feel. gl.oomy.

I feel light.

I ama· lively person.

I like to go to movies.

am crestfallen.
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Response Form for Judgments of Category Frequency

Positive Qualities
Negative Qualities
Neutral Statements
C"r like ••• "I

APPENDIX C
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APPENDIX C
Cell Means for Item Frequency Estimates

Actual Frequency
0

1

2

3

4

D

0.38

1.34

2.48

3.17

3.75

ND

0.48

l . 79

2.94

3.29

3.81

D

0.03

1.29

2.31

3.06

3.94

ND

0.05

1. 75

2.67

3.25

4.25

D

0.02

1.08

2.31

3.02

4.25

ND

0.00

1.36

2.65

3.25

4.06

Positive
Statements

Negative
Statements

Neutral
Statements

Note: Each mean is based on an n of 16.
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